all

all

Kurds prepare to launch ground offensive against Iran

“We believe we have a big chance now,” a senior Iranian Kurdish official said.

Activists hold Kurdish and Israeli flags during a protest outside the Branch Office of the Embassy of the United States of America in Tel Aviv, January 21, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90
Activists hold Kurdish and Israeli flags during a protest outside the Branch Office of the Embassy of the United States of America in Tel Aviv, January 21, 2026. Photo by Chaim Goldberg/Flash90

(JNS) The start of a joint military campaign by Israel and the United States on Feb. 28 has fundamentally transformed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. From the very first strikes, “Operation Roaring Lion/Epic Fury” moved past a long-standing policy of containment toward the active structural degradation of the Iranian regime.

These operations have so far targeted Iranian political leadership, the command-and-control networks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian Army, missile launchers, air defense and other regime targets.

As Israel and the US aircraft have systematically pushed deeper into the Iranian heartland, regime control over the provinces on the western and southern flanks has been systematically degraded.

These western provinces along the Zagros mountain range are home to a vast population of ethnic Kurds who have historically been subjugated by the Islamic Republic and are now increasingly being viewed as a critical asset in any attempt to replace the regime in Tehran.

While Israeli and US airstrikes have neutralized the regime’s high-level military assets, both countries are currently unwilling to commit “boots on the ground” for the sake of securing territory.

Recent reports indicate that this strategic gap is being increasingly filled by Kurdish militias that have been in rebellion since the uprisings in January 2026. As the IRGC’s regional control falters, the Kurdish leadership has identified the current period as a definitive turning point for their political objectives.

“We believe we have a big chance now,” as a senior Iranian Kurdish official characterized the situation in a recent interview.

The Kurdish forces

The operational significance of the 2026 Kurdish mobilization was solidified in a unification that occurred just six days before the commencement of allied airstrikes on Iran. Although the Kurdish rebellion formally began on Jan. 5, 2026, with widespread general strikes and early armed skirmishes by various Kurdish militias, it remained a fragmented insurgency until late February.

On Feb. 22, five principal Iranian Kurdish opposition parties—the PDKI, PAK, PJAK, the Khabat Organization and the Komala Party—signed a historic Charter of Cooperation in Erbil, Iraq. This agreement established a Joint Command Center designed to integrate the forces under one command structure.

The resulting organization, the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan (CPFIK), synthesized diverse ideological perspectives, ranging from traditional nationalism to democratic confederalism, creating a single operational front against the Tehran regime.

Since its inception, the CPFIK operated across the Zagros mountain range, using rear bases in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, specifically Koya, Zargwez, and the Qandil Mountains, to stage incursions into the Iranian provinces of West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan and Kermanshah.

Since Feb. 28, the coalition has entered preparations for an active “territorial holding” phase to capitalize on the vacuum created by allied airstrikes. While the coalition does not yet permanently govern major urban centers, it has begun establishing full control over strategic corridors and high-alpine pockets all along the Iraqi-Iranian border.

Estimates place the coalition’s ready force at between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters, many of whom are positioned in holding patterns in border camps near Koya and Zargwez.

The coalition has augmented this by mobilizing reserve units from the civilian Kurdish population. This organized military capability contrasts sharply with the monarchist and secular-liberal movements in the Iranian diaspora. While the latter maintain international recognition and media influence, they lack a parallel “boots on the ground” component within Iran, positioning the Kurdish forces as the primary opposition domestic military structure capable of holding territory.

 External support and tactical role

The increased significance of the Kurdish forces has been underscored by an unprecedented backchannel established between the White House and the Kurdish leadership.

On March 1, President Donald Trump initiated discussions with Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masoud Barzani and Bafel Talabani regarding the use of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as a primary staging ground for the transit of weaponry into Iran. This engagement escalated on March 3, with a direct telephone call to Mustafa Hijri of the PDKI, during which the president reportedly offered “extensive US air cover” to facilitate Kurdish maneuvers in western Iran.

This high-level communication has translated into direct operational synergy. While the initial phase of the conflict focused on the aerial destruction of Iranian command-and-control infrastructure, according to Israeli and US sources, the strategy is likely to evolve into a coordinated ground effort.

“The war started with a kinetic phase by the US and Israeli militaries, but as the war continues, there will be other efforts by the Mossad and the CIA,” an Israeli official noted regarding the transition to unconventional warfare.

Reports from Axios and CNN indicate that the CIA and Mossad are providing light arms and real-time target data to Kurdish units. Furthermore, recent analysis of US and Israeli targets since the start of the war indicates that the target bank was in part specifically designed to “pave the way” for Kurdish incursions by neutralizing the regime’s Law Enforcement Command (LEC) hubs in border regions such as Sanandaj, Ilam and Marivan.

Despite broad confirming reports, the Trump administration at this point denies direct involvement in Kurdish operations in the region.

During a closed-door briefing to Congress on March 3, Secretary of State Marco Rubio addressed the growing reports of military aid to the Kurds. “We’re not arming the Kurds. But you never know with the Israelis,” Rubio said.

As the CPFIK begins to channel troops toward the cross-border corridors, concrete logistical preparations to transition the group toward sustained ground operations inside Iran are also ramping up. According to the SpecialEurasia consulting and media agency, reports from Erbil markets suggest “a massive surge in the purchase of cold-weather gear, fuel and medical supplies” by the CPFIK, confirming they are preparing for a sustained presence inside Iranian territory rather than just a hit-and-run raid.”

A further psychological and tactical component of this preparatory phase is the Defection Directive issued on March 2. The CPFIK urged members of the Iranian regular army (Artesh) to “separate from the remnants of the regime and join the side of the nation.”

According to Kurdish sources, the CPFIK hopes that by securing and holding physical territory, the coalition will provide a geographic refuge for defecting soldiers who might otherwise face immediate execution by regime loyalists. These zones are intended to function as magnets for military dissent, offering a tangible alternative to the crumbling IRGC command structure.

According to a recent report by SpecialEurasia, the primary strategic aim is not a direct march on Tehran, but a tactical diversion. By engaging IRGC units in the mountainous periphery, the coalition forces the regime to draw its security apparatus away from major urban centers such as Tehran and Isfahan. This creates the operational space necessary for a wider popular uprising among unarmed civilian protesters.

The report further points out that by drawing the regime forces out of the cities, the Kurds will neutralize a significant regime tactical advantage, as the mountainous terrain of the Zagros region favors Kurdish light infantry and will prevent the large-scale deployment of mechanized forces, which can be easily used in the urban centers.

Resistance to the operation

The 2026 Kurdish rebellion operates within a high-friction geopolitical environment where the interests of regional neighbors and diaspora leadership often collide. A primary source of tension is the delicate position of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. While the KRG territory serves as the de facto launchpad for the offensive, officials in Erbil maintain a policy of public neutrality to avoid retaliatory IRGC missile strikes on Iraqi soil.

Internal opposition dynamics are further strained by the “Pahlavi factor.”

Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi has explicitly condemned the Kurdish alliance, characterizing the CPFIK as “separatist” and declaring Iran’s territorial integrity a “red line.”

In a statement released on Feb. 25, Pahlavi urged the regular army to confront these groups upon the regime’s eventual collapse to prevent the “Balkanization” of the country. This highlights a fundamental divide between the Kurdish focus on self-determination and the diaspora’s insistence on a centralized, unitary state.

External pressure is further felt from Ankara, where the Turkish government views the inclusion of the PJAK, a group affiliated with the Turkish separatist group PKK, as an existential threat. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has described the escalating conflict as a “scripted scenario” that risks a “global catastrophe” should a power vacuum empower militant enclaves along the Turkish-Iranian border. These concerns threaten the coalition’s northern flank, as Turkey maintains the military capability to intervene if it perceives the Kurdish territorial gains as a threat.

The Iranian state has responded to the Kurdish mobilization with a combination of direct military strikes, diplomatic pressure on Baghdad and a domestic propaganda campaign designed to frame the rebellion as a foreign conspiracy.

On March 5, Iran’s intelligence ministry announced it had conducted joint operations with the IRGC to strike Kurdish headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming to have destroyed ammunition depots and inflicted “heavy losses” on groups preparing for a cross-border incursion. These strikes included the use of ballistic missiles and drones against the Azadi camp of the PDKI in Koya and Komala facilities in Zargwez.

Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, issued a warning to the coalition, stating, “Separatist groups should not think that a breeze has blown and try to take action. We will not tolerate them in any way.”

Tehran’s strategy also focuses on neutralizing Iraq as a staging ground. Iranian-backed militias, including Kataib Hezbollah and other elements of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), have intensified pressure on the Kurdistan Regional Government to remain neutral.

Kataib Hezbollah issued a public ultimatum urging Kurdish leaders to act “rationally” and avoid participation in a “military adventure targeting the Islamic Republic.”

This pressure prompted the KRG Interior Ministry to issue a stern warning on Feb. 28, stating that the Kurdistan Region “will not allow” its territory to be used as a launchpad for operations against neighboring states.

Domestically, the Iranian government has utilized state media to disseminate reports of cooperation with “noble Kurds” to thwart an “Israeli-American” plan to attack Iranian soil. By framing the CPFIK as “separatist terrorist groups” supported by the “Zionist enemy,” the regime seeks to consolidate nationalistic sentiment and delegitimize the rebellion’s call for self-determination.

Despite these efforts, the IRGC has been forced to redeploy ground forces to border cities such as Oshnavieh and Piranshahr to counter small reconnaissance elements that have begun crossing from the Iraqi side.

Want more news from Israel?
Click Here to sign up for our FREE daily email updates

About the author

Patrick Callahan

This is an example of author bio/description. Beard fashion axe trust fund, post-ironic listicle scenester. Uniquely mesh maintainable users rather than plug-and-play testing procedures.

Leave a Reply

Login

Privacy Overview

This website uses cookies so that we can provide you with the best user experience possible. Cookie information is stored in your browser and performs functions such as recognising you when you return to our website and helping our team to understand which sections of the website you find most interesting and useful.