(JCPA) The recent events in Syria—specifically the massacre carried out against the Druze community in Sweida and the subsequent flare-up between Israel and Syria—have overshadowed the tectonic changes unfolding in Lebanon.
During his third visit to Lebanon, US envoy Thomas Barrack stated at a press conference that the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Lebanon, signed on Nov. 26, 2024, had failed. Barrack outlined the reasons for the failure, singling out Hezbollah’s refusal to disarm and the Lebanese government’s inability to disarm the Shi’ite militia.
Barrack emphasized that it was now up to the Lebanese government to find an internal solution, as the US was in no position to ask Israel for further concessions. These would have been contingent on commitments expressed by the Lebanese government and agreed upon by Hezbollah concerning the necessity of disarming the terrorist group.
These statements followed a series of provocations by Hezbollah, which were met with acceptance by the Lebanese government. During the Ashura ceremonies, Hezbollah held an armed parade in the streets of Beirut. Though some participants were apprehended with a promise of prosecution, they were later released.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem reiterated that Hezbollah would not disarm as long as Israel continued to occupy Southern Lebanon. This stance was further justified, in his view, by the jihadist attacks against the Druze in Sweida and the Alawites in northwestern Syria.
Hezbollah and its supporters argued that the militia could not disarm while facing a potential jihadist threat from Syria, as had occurred in 2011–2013. Tensions were also heightened by organized protests in Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, where demonstrators hailed the regime of Ahmad al-Sharaa. This came amid reports suggesting that Tripoli, a Sunni-majority town, might one day be annexed to Syria, mirroring its pre-1920 status before the French mandate added it to Lebanon.
Hezbollah never intended to disarm
Further compounding the situation, Barrack was dismayed to discover that the Lebanese government’s answers to US inquiries mirrored Hezbollah’s public positions. The reality became clear: Hezbollah never intended to disarm.
While the Lebanese army appeared to uncover weapons caches in the south, the most strategic Hezbollah positions remained untouched. Israel, well aware of this duplicity, continued intermittent strikes on Hezbollah operatives and positions in both southern and northern Lebanon.
Buoyed by a landslide victory in municipal elections, Hezbollah continued to defy both the Lebanese government and the US. It rejected the Lebanese Central Bank’s Directive 170, which targeted Hezbollah’s parallel banking structure, particularly its financial arm, Al-Qard Al-Hassan (“The Benevolent Loan”). This organization operates outside Lebanon’s formal banking system. In a defiant response, Hezbollah announced the opening of four new branches, raising the total to 40.
Recently, Hezbollah declared that it had completed a reorganization and replenishment of its arsenal and was ready to confront Israel again when the time comes.
To add insult to injury, an agreement announced in June—during the high-profile visit of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas—called for the disarmament of Palestinian factions in 12 refugee camps in Lebanon. The process was to begin with three camps in the Beirut area. However, the June 15 start date came and went, and the agreement remained ink on paper.
Given the US assessment that no meaningful progress is occurring, the central question revolves around what comes next. Lebanese media, spanning the political spectrum, are painting a nightmare scenario: Israel may resume military operations against Hezbollah once it becomes evident that it will not yield to pressure and the Lebanese government is incapable of fulfilling its promises, continuing instead a cat-and-mouse game with the US envoy.
Some even speculate that Israel may launch a preemptive strike to deliver a crushing blow to Hezbollah, compelling it to capitulate or negotiate.
For the time being, the US appears to lack a concrete strategy. Barrack has proposed that the Lebanese government initiate negotiations with Hezbollah’s so-called political wing. He also suggested that Hezbollah be asked to disarm its long-range weapons, which threaten Israel’s security. So far, there has been no response to these proposals.
Meanwhile, the US (alongside Qatar) continues to fund the salaries of the Lebanese army and supply weapons and training. The hope remains that the army will one day overcome sectarian divisions and enable the government to assert sovereignty over the entire country.
However, it is increasingly unlikely that the US will invest significant diplomatic capital in supporting Lebanon at international forums as long as Hezbollah maintains its grip on the country’s finances and no structural reforms are adopted.
The rapidly evolving situation in Syria and the possibility of a jihadist incursion across the border is also drawing attention. Such a development could momentarily sideline efforts to disarm Hezbollah, as focus would shift toward confronting an existential threat—one that could disrupt Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance and plunge the nation into civil war.
Originally published by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs.
